數學與金融經典教材(影印版)·激勵理論:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model]

數學與金融經典教材(影印版)·激勵理論:委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

[美] 拉奉特(Laffont J.J.) 著
圖書標籤:
  • 經濟學
  • 金融學
  • 激勵理論
  • 委托代理
  • 數學模型
  • 經典教材
  • 影印版
  • 理論經濟學
  • 微觀經濟學
  • 博弈論
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出版社: 世界图书出版公司
ISBN:9787510050503
版次:1
商品编码:11154485
包装:平装
外文名称:The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model
开本:16开
出版时间:2013-01-01
用纸:胶版纸
页数:421
正文语种:英文

具体描述

內容簡介

  The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

內頁插圖

目錄

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

  The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead, our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
  The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
  Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
  ……

用户评价

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委托代理理论

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经典教材,值得仔细阅读,写论文要用,所以就买了

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。。。。。。。。。。。。

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1975年,拉丰教授放弃了在美国一流大学任教的机会,毅然回到法国开始了他艰难的振兴法国经济学的历程.由于在巴黎法国理工学院推行经济学改革遭遇的阻力太大,他只身回到家乡图卢兹,在图卢兹大学任教并传播主流经济学,同时不懈地开创经济学的新领域.经过十几年孤独而又艰苦的创业,1990年,法国产业经济研究所(IDEI)宣布成立,拉丰教授任IDEI主任.在他的爱国热情的感召下,包括让·梯若尔在内的一批在国际上享有盛誉的法国经济学家都来到使它的学术水平和教育质量获得了空前的提高.如今的IDEI已经成为经济学界公认的世界第一的产业经济学研究中心.拉丰教授传播经济学的热情并不局限在法国,他尤其关注发展中国家发展过程中制度变革所带来的激励问题.a他认为发展中国家制度变革的选择最终决定了该国的发展道路,而要顺利地完成一个合理、有效的制度变迁,必须要有一批真正的经济学家参与这一过程.为此,他不遗余力地为发展中国家培养年轻的经济学者,并要求他们学成后回国积极投身经济制度改革.同时他不辞辛劳地到中国、拉美、非洲等地讲学,传播经济学思想,并积极参与发展中国家产业规制政策的实证研究.拉丰教授传播经济学思想的热情和对经济学理论所作的巨大贡献使他赢得了极高的国际声誉.

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民事法律行为的委托代理,可以用书面形式,也可以用口头形式。法律规定用书面形式的,应当用书面形式。[1]

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非常满意,五星

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拉丰教授是一个极其勤奋,因而高产的学者,迄今为止已经出版了12本专著和300多篇高水平的学术论文.他的学术贡献为他在经济学界赢得了极高的声誉.同时,作为一个著名的经济学教育家,他为法国经济学的振兴作出了巨大的贡献.

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